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Introduction. Transatlantic Relations in times of Uncertainty: Crises and EU-US Relations. 
 
Marianne Riddervold and Akasemi Newsome 
 
Abstract: 
Ties between the US and the EU rival those between any other pair of international actors. This 
Special Issue makes conceptual progress and empirical contributions in accounting for if and how 
EU-US relations have been impacted by a context of multiple crises and a parallel change in US 
policies. All the articles find strong evidence to suggest that EU-US relations are weakening. This 
is partly a consequence of the EU’s own, internal policies, as it becomes more unified and 
autonomous of the US in some areas, while fragmenting in others. Most importantly, it is a 
consequence of the two actors’ increasingly diverging perspectives and positions on international 
issues, institutions, norms and indeed the value of the transatlantic relationship as such. Although 
the long-term effects remain to be seen, it is likely that the cracks in the foundation of transatlantic 
relations will continue into the present and foreseeable future. 
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Introduction. 
Ties between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) rival those between any 
other pair of international actors. After all, no other regions of the world are as closely connected 
in economics, security and politics as Europe and the US (Oliver 2016: 2,  see also Alcaro, Greco 
and Peterson 2016; Frölich 2012; Hill, Smith and Vanhoonacker 2017; Ilgen 2016; Peterson and 
Pollack 2003; Sola and Smith 2009). As the EU confronts and seeks to deal with multiple crises, 
this special issue asks how, if in any way, this context of crises affect the US-EU relationship? Are 
EU-US relations imperiled following the EU’s responses, or lack thereof? Or does the context of 
multiple crises offer opportunities to strengthen the transatlantic partnership? The question of US-
EU relations has become all the more pressing since the 2016 election of U.S. President Donald 
Trump. Trump has already challenged some of the core principles underlying transatlantic 
relations since the Second World War, including the US defense guarantee, open trade relations 
and the support for multilateral institutions and agreements such as the Paris accord on climate 
change and the Iran nuclear accord. Some commentators even question whether Trump’s actions 
are undermining the entire ‘liberal international order’, suggesting that the transatlantic 
relationship in itself is in a state of crisis (Ikenberry 2018. See also Rose 2018). According to 
 2 
Fareed Zakaria, for example, “Trump appears to be walking away from the idea of America at the 
center of an open, rule-based international order. This would be a reversal of more than 70 years 
of U.S. foreign policy” (Zakaria 2017). 
Against this background, the objective of this special issue is to make both conceptual 
progress and empirical contributions in accounting for if and how EU-US relations have been 
impacted by the context of multiple crises which have beset the EU in recent years and the parallel 
change in US policies. To help tease this out, the eight articles address one or both of the following 
questions: 1) Is the EU unified vis-a-vis the US in its dealing with crises, or are the EU member 
states becoming more fragmented in their response? 2) To what extent are US and EU relations 
strengthening or weakening in different fields? By offering an answer, we address several gaps in 
the literature. Not surprisingly, much has been written about transatlantic relations (examples 
include Anderson et al. 2008; Frölich 2012; Ikenberry 2018; Ilgen 2016; Peterson and Pollack 
2003; McGuire and Smith 2008; Rose 2018; Peterson 2018; Sola and Smith 2009; Smith 2011). 
After all, ‘the transatlantic relationship has been one of the central features of international 
relations since the end of the World War II’ (Hanhimäki et al 2012: 1). Much has also been written 
about the impact of different crises on EU policies and institutions (examples include special issues 
by; Cross and Karolewski 2017, Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter 2016; Falkner 2016; Graziano 
and Halpern 2016; Hooghe, Laffan and Marks 2018; Niemann and Zaun 2018). Surprisingly little 
has however been written about how, if in any way, this context of crises relate to and impact EU-
US relations. There are some articles exploring individual cases, including on EU-NATO relations 
and on Brexit and transatlantic relations (Bulmer and Quaglia 2018; Oliver and Williams 2016; 
Smith and Gebhard). However, there are no systematic studies across cases focusing on the context 
of EU crises and transatlantic relations. In a globalized world and in light of the historically close 
economic, political and security-related relations between the US and the EU, this gap in the 
literature is puzzling and is what this special issue attempts to address. Acknowledging that more 
long-term effects remain to be seen,  this special issue thus seeks to produce more generalizable 
findings about contemporary EU-US relations and the status and characteristics of the transatlantic 
relationship than what has so far been provided in the existing literature. In so doing we also 
contribute to a better understanding of the factors that inform EU policies and responses to crises.  
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows. We first set out the empirical 
background for the special issue, briefly discussing the context of crises and how we think of this 
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as an impetus to a likely change in the EU-US relationship. Thereafter follows a discussion of the 
analytical framework we apply in order to say something more general about  contemporary EU-
US relations, setting out four types of possible relationships. We then move to our findings. In 
presenting the findings, we organize the articles in three thematic areas that not only go to the core 
of the transatlantic relationship but that also allow us to systematically tease out more generalizable 
findings about if and how EU-US relations are changing in the face of crises and a changing US 
policy-orientation: (1) ‘Foreign, Security and Defence Policy’, (2) ‘Multilateral Governance’ and 
what we, building on Peterson (2018, this issue), call ‘Structure and agency: US leadership and 
the transatlantic partnership.’ We end by briefly summing up our overall findings in relation to the 
special issue’s main questions.  Although with some variation across the articles, the terms EU-
US relations and transatlantic relations are used interchangeably in this issue, in line with Smith’s 
definition of transatlantic relations as ‘the overall set of relations between the European Union and 
the United States, within the broader framework of the institutional and other connections 
maintained via NATO and other institutions’ (Smith, 2018: x). 
 
A Perfect Storm: The context of crises and the EU-US relationship 
Hardly a day goes by without observers and scholars commenting on the different crises 
and challenges the EU has been facing in recent years. Despite electoral setbacks faced by 
populist parties in France and the Netherlands in 2016 and 2017, nationalist, 
euroskeptic parties made significant inroads in the 2017 Germany and Austrian 
elections as well as the 2017 and 2018 Czech elections and thus continue to pose 
a significant obstacle to European unity.  With the June 2016 Brexit vote, one of the EU’s 
biggest and most influential member states has decided to leave the Union, thus posing an 
existential challenge to the EU after almost sixty years of continuous integration (Schimmelfennig 
2018). Externally, the EU has to contend with a much more aggressive Russia making territorial 
claims or interfering militarily in the EU’s near abroad. As a result of conflicts in Syria and other 
developing world hotspots, the EU has also witnessed an explosion of refugees and immigrants 
coming to Europe in search for a better life – 1,3 million asylum applications in the EU in 2015, 
1,2 million in 2016 and 705,000 in 2017 (EUROSTAT 2018). In addition to these more immediate 
crises, the EU must also confront a number of more long-term challenges, not least the global 
financial crisis; as well as climate change and the environmental challenges associated with global 
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warming (cf. Caporaso and Rhodes 2016; Cross and Karolewski 2017; Hume and Pawle 2015; 
MacFarlane and Menon 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Pop 2015). Many of these challenges are facing 
the US as well. In the US, anti-establishment sentiments h a v e  a l s o  p r o f o u nd l y  ch a ng e d  
U S  p o l i t i c s ,  e v i d e n t  n o t  l e a s t  i n  T r u mp’ s  e l e c t i o n  a s  U S  p r e s i d e n t  i n  2 0 16 .  
There is a growing fear of Islamic terrorism following attacks both in Europe and in the US, such 
as the one in Orlando in 2016 and in New York City in 2017. The US is directly involved in the 
conflicts from which many of the refugees coming to the EU are fleeing. Similar to the EU 
countries, the US is facing more assertive powers with a different perspective on international 
regulation and governance than the one traditionally held by the Western states – rising powers 
who also increasingly make territorial claims it cannot accept, not least Russia in Ukraine and the 
Arctic, and China in the South China Sea. Long-term challenges linked to financial instability and 
climate change are also concerns that the EU and the US share, although at the outset, it seems as 
though they have more divergent  than convergent views on these issues.   
The numerous crises and challenges confronting the EU combine to form the ‘perfect 
storm’ of conditions that make this particular historical moment in transatlantic affairs so crucial 
to understand. Building on Ikenberry’s definition of crisis as ‘an extraordinary moment when the 
existence and viability of the political order are called into question’ (Anderson, Ikenberry and 
Risse 2008: 3; Cross and Ma 2015), we start from the assumption that it is the collective weight of 
the multiple (both internal and external) crises that potentially is challenging the EU’s ability to 
hang together and that in turn may affect its relationship with its core strategic partner and indeed 
the cornerstone of the post war international system or ‘Atlantic Order’. Our intention is thus not 
to assess each of these crises and challenges per se but rather to use the context of multiple crises 
and the parallel change in the US’ foreign policy orientation as the backdrop to and intellectual 
imperative for our analyses, which seeks to make a new contribution to the field of scholarly and 
policy analytical commentaries on the EU in crisis and the EU-US relationship.1 While some of 
the articles do engage explicitly with individual crises such as the article comparing the Syria and 
Kosovo refugee crises, other articles examine the domain of security and defence issues and 
interrogate multiple crises in order to investigate the changing nature of EU-US security relations, 
including EU-NATO relations and the evolution of the EU as a security actor in the post 9/11 era. 
As EU-US relations form the core of the liberal global order, a substantive secondary theme 
                                               
1 We are grateful to one of our reviewers for this suggestion.  
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common to several of the articles is that of global governance in times of crises. These articles 
generally tackle the question of world order and the varying (and waning) commitment to 
multilateralism with concrete examples such as the Paris Climate Accord, Iran nuclear deal 
negotiations and the failed TTIP agreement. Lastly, two articles examine how US leadership has 
important ramifications for US-EU relations, again in the context of multiple, overlapping crises.  
For methodological reasons and since we are interested in US-EU relations in the context 
of crises foremost from an EU perspective, in the case study articles, we explore cases that are 
mainly or partly organized intergovernmentally in the sense that the EU member states ultimately 
can choose to withdraw or agree to common policies. Only in this way can we systematically study 
the level of EU integration or fragmentation with the backdrop of crises (question 1) as well as the 
development of putative collective or individual ties between EU member states and the US 
(question 2). In this way, we also acknowledge that the EU`s ability to deal with crises in the end 
often comes down the political will of the individual member states to cooperate and form common 
policies. We however also wish to underscore that the variation flowing from the differences in 
cases heavily situated in intergovernmental areas (security) and supranational areas (trade) is 
precisely what provides greater analytical and empirical leverage in macroscopic type of study 
such as this.2  
 
 
Framework: Crises and EU-US relations 
 
Table 1. Crises and EU-US relations  
EU-US 
relations 
 Weakened relations  Strengthened relations 
Level of EU 
cohesion 
Unified EU Fragmented 
EU 
Unified EU Fragmented EU 
Type of 
transatlantic 
relations 
Emerging EU 
super power 
 Unravelling 
EU-US 
relations. 
US Hegemony 
Resilient and 
strong EU in 
Differentiated 
relations. 
                                               
2 Thank you to an anonomou reviewer for making this point.  
 6 
EU internal 
cohesion, 
independently of 
the US. 
External 
competition with 
the US, or 
different policies 
conducted.  
 
EU unable to 
agree 
internally. 
Fragmentation 
of member 
states’ 
positions and 
policies vis a 
vis the US. 
 
cooperation 
with US.  
EU internal 
adaption of US 
policies and 
preferences. 
External 
division of 
labour  
Strong transatlantic 
ties between a core 
group of EU 
member states and 
the US 
 
 
In seeking to tease out how, if in any way, the context of crises and challenges have affected 
EU-US relations, the articles in this collection relate to four analytically distinct but empirically 
overlapping types of possible EU-US relationships, in line with the two questions raised. At the 
outset, multiple contemporary crises might both unify and fragment EU member states vis a vis 
the US (Question 1) and they might both weaken and strengthen transatlantic relations and 
cooperation (Question 2). Combining these, we call the four types of relationships 1) An emerging 
EU super power, 2) Unravelling of transatlantic relations, 3) US Hegemony and 4) Differentiated 
relations (see Table 1).  
On the one hand, we might be witnessing a weakening of transatlantic relations. 
Notwithstanding the deep economic, strategic, and values- based ties between the EU and the US, 
transatlantic relations are facing a number of severe challenges. Already under Obama, US foreign 
policy reshuffled priorities such that Asia moved to the top of the agenda (Binnendijk 2014), 
diverting attention and resources away from Europe. US administrations have for a long time 
criticized the low levels of spending by EU member nations on defense particularly regarding 
contributions to NATO of which only the UK, Poland, Greece and Estonia meet the 2% GDP 
minimum (Bremmer 2016). For US actors concerned with defense policy, the Ukraine crisis, 
recent terror attacks and the war in Syria support a view that the EU does not expend enough 
resources for security. Areas of economic cooperation also reveal contentious splits between 
transatlantic elites in favor of expanded free trade and ordinary voters expressing anti-globalization 
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sentiments in the EU and the US (see Peterson 2018 this volume).  The 2016 US presidential 
election strongly sharpened these tensions. Arguments raised by President Donald Trump 
regarding transatlantic security cooperation, even questioning the US’ willingness to protect 
European states in cases of military threats, have increased fear amongst European countries that 
the US might not be willing to honor its traditional commitments (Economist 2016; Walt 2017). 
Contrary to the EU’s policies and in spite of strong coordinated European efforts in opposition, 
the US has withdrawn from the Iran nuclear accord, the Paris climate negotiations and the 
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Smith 2018, this 
issue).  
A weakened transatlantic relationship could also go hand in hand with a more cohesive and 
stronger Union, if the member states unify in their responses to the crises they are facing, 
suggesting the emergence of what we call an autonomous EU superpower. Studies have for 
example suggested that crises can trigger more EU integration to address shared challenges, 
leading to new policies or more delegation of powers to EU institutions in a variety of different 
policy fields affected by crisis (Cross and Karolewski 2017; Mény 2014; Majone 2005; Genschel 
and Jachtenfuchs 2014; Schmitter 1970).  In fact, the EU has already responded to developments 
such as the Ukraine crisis by further strengthening EU foreign and security cooperation (Cross and 
Karolewski 2017; Howorth 2018 this issue; Riddervold 2018; M.E. Smith, this issue), by claiming 
to take the global lead in the fight against climate change (Cross this issue), by remaining 
committed to uphold the Iran Nuclear Accord, and it is strengthening its ties with China in support 
of the global, liberal economic order. Theoretically, the possibility that crises weaken transatlantic 
relations could for example be in line with a neo-realist ‘soft balancing’ hypothesis, suggesting 
that rather than accepting the status quo as the US’ junior partner, the EU aims ‘to increase both 
its autonomy from the United States and its ability to act on the international scene’ (Howorth and 
Menon, 2009 p. 731; Posen 2006). That the EU is becoming more unified, stronger and more 
independent of the US in different fields would however also be in line with perspectives 
underlining the difference rather than the similarities between the US and the EU. In particular, 
due to its focus on multilateral norms and institutions, the EU is often described not only as a soft 
but also as a ‘normative’ or ‘humanitarian’ power (see for example Kreeutz 2015; Manners 2002; 
Riddervold 2011; Sjursen 2015).  
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It might however also be that the EU member states are not able to unify in response to 
crisis, but instead are becoming more fragmented in their responses to contemporary challenges.  
As is well documented, cooperation among EU member states within EU institutions can be a 
thorny undertaking. In light of all the crises that have beset the EU in recent years, realist 
observers have in particular pointed to the EU’s inability to act and criticized its lack of 
appropriate joint policy-responses to contemporary challenges such as external migration or a 
changing international security landscape (see for example Macfarlane & Menon 2014; 
Mearsheimer, 2014; Posen, 2014; Walt 2014.). External actors might also serve to undermine EU 
unity, for example through attempts to ‘divide and conquer’, as we have seen on issues linked to 
access to natural resources (Russia) or in relation to trade (China; Riddervold and Rosen 2018, 
this issue). If not coordinated in the EU, special relationships between the US and some member 
states might also contribute to internal EU fragmentation (Smith 2018, this issue). A context of 
parallel crises may in other words also fragment the EU project and in combination with a 
weakening relationship hence lead to what we call an unravelling of EU-US relations.  
On the other hand, despite dramatic headlines of unprecedented crisis in transatlantic 
relations and calls for a ‘transatlantic divorce’ (Walt 2017), crises could potentially also unite the 
US and the EU in common responses under continued US leadership and thus strengthen EU-US 
relations in important areas. We call this possibility US Hegemony, suggesting that the US 
continues to lead the transatlantic relationship, but with a stronger and more united Europe as its 
partner.  Notwithstanding Donald Trump’s shifting but mostly skeptical comments about the EU, 
many US leaders and politicians have expressed a strong preference for a unified Europe in the 
EU, able to speak with one voice, that can form a reliable junior-partner to the US both in Europe 
and globally (Anderson 2018 this volume). According to some studies, a division of labor between 
the US and the EU is moreover developing in dealing with international conflicts. While the US 
often responds militarily to crises, the EU is more of a ‘soft power’ (Cooper 2003; Nye 2004; Also 
see Howorth and Menon 2009). Theoretically, building on the neo-realist concept of 
bandwagoning, crises could lead to stronger transatlantic ties if the EU accepts the US’ hegemony 
and joins forces with it as a junior partner, in response to particular structural challenges or as part 
of a geopolitical balancing game (Walt 1998; Waltz 2000). Following a liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach, one may also expect strengthened ties to form between the two 
owing to economic interdependencies and common interests in the face of financial challenges 
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(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Other more constructivist and historical institutionalist 
perspectives would instead focus on factors such as the impact of existing institutions, long-term 
socialization and common values and norms of appropriate behavior when explaining why an EU-
US partnership may prove to withstand shifting US administrations and even strengthen in the face 
of crises (Anderson et al. 2008; Elgström and Smith 2006; Sola and Smith 2009, Anderson 2018 
this issue, Peterson 2018 this issue and Smith this issue). After all, according to Ikenberry, the 
strong US-led relationship between Europe and the US sometimes referred to as the Atlantic 
Political Order has rested not only on common strategic interests and threat perceptions, but 
equally importantly, on shared values and  institutional platforms (Ikenberry 2008. Also see 
Anderson 2018 this issue).  
Lastly, instead of a strengthening of EU-US relations taking place between a coherent EU 
on the one hand and a dominant US on the other, there is also the possibility that ties could 
strengthen between the US and a group of EU member states only, cooperating within the EU’s 
institutional structure in response to particular challenges. Rather than uniting the EU in 
cooperation with the US, we may hence see both of these scenarios playing out, through what is 
often referred to as differentiated integration in the EU (Leuffen et al 2012). If, for example, a 
subset of EU member states decide to integrate further, overall or in certain policy fields, and also 
cooperate more closely with the US in these policy areas, we may witness what we call 
strengthened differentiated transatlantic relations.  
 
Findings:  A weakening EU-US relationship 
Foreign, security and defence policy. 
Foreign, security and defence policies have traditionally been at the core of transatlantic relations, 
and three of the articles in this special issue,  by Jolyon Howorth, Michael E. Smith, and Marianne 
Riddervold and Guri Rosén, address this topic, exploring both EU unity and EU-US relations in 
the domain. Where is EU foreign and security policy going and what is its relationship to NATO 
and the US? In a changing and more uncertain world, following Brexit and the election of Trump, 
how autonomous is the EU really, and what do EU developments imply for the EU-US relationship 
in the security domain? In relation to the special issue’s questions, overall, our foreign and security 
policy articles suggest that the crises context has resulted in a slow weakening of traditional US-
EU security relations. The three articles also show that the EU is becoming more unified and more 
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independent of the US in its foreign and security policies. Clearly, most European states still rely 
on the US as their main security guarantee. Moreover, as these articles also underline, if facing a 
severe threat, the EU and the US will stand together, for example in relation to Russia or China. 
However, one should not underestimate EU developments in the foreign and security policy  
domain. We also find that this development is driven by a combination of factors, including an 
ability to band together in the face of common external threats and challenges, the EU over time 
learning from experience, and the gradual realization that the EU must take more responsibility 
for its own security. The EU and the US’ increasingly diverging approaches to security and defence 
also further serve to fuel this development. Although perhaps not a superpower, the EU is without 
doubt more autonomous and indeed a stronger foreign and security player today than ever before, 
and it expresses a clear ambition of further strengthening its strategic autonomy.  As highlighted 
by M.E Smith’s article, this ambition will in itself probably influence the EU’s ability to integrate 
even further in this domain. Well aware that one cannot predict the future, it is thus also reasonable 
to assume that the future organization of European security and defence somehow will involve the 
EU – either in cooperation with NATO, somehow integrated into the NATO structure, or in a more 
independent and stronger version of the EU’s common security and defence policy.  
 In his paper on the future of European Security and Defence, Jolyon Howorth addresses 
this last point directly, asking how EU defence can move forward and resolve the tension between 
the EU’s ambition of “strategic autonomy” laid out in the 2016 EU Global strategy on the one 
hand and the role of NATO and the US in European defence on the other. Much in line with the 
special issue introduction, Howorth lays out three options for the EU for common defence: If the 
EU is still too divided to integrate further in the area of defence, it could decide to rely totally on 
US. However, since European dependency on US military power is no longer an US policy option, 
this would result in a fragmented Europe and weakened transatlantic relations. The second option 
would be for the EU to spend more on military capability but not enough to protect itself from 
nuclear threats or exert any force in Asia. In this case the EU would be more unified but the 
transatlantic relationship might stay weak. The final scenario is one in which the EU spends enough 
to handle all security and military threats independently and implies that at minimum the EU is 
equal to NATO, a scenario that Howorth views would both unify Europe and strengthen 
transatlantic relations under US Hegemony. In favour of this third scenario, Howorth makes an 
argument for merging the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) into NATO and 
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slowly taking over the leadership away from the Americans. In contrast to Smith’s paper on 
multilateralism (see below) which locates forces for weakened EU integration and weakened 
transatlantic relations in internal differentiation across policy areas, Howorth views one crisis in 
particular –Brexit—as impetus for closer cooperation among EU member states in common 
security and defense. With Brexit, the positions of the remaining large powers on the question of 
greater military capability—France and Germany—are much closer together than the stark divide 
that previously existed between the UK and France preceding the Brexit referendum. Howorth 
presents the European Defence Union or CSDP-redux as evidence that Brexit indeed has prepared 
the way for deeper integration in European security and defense.  
Michael E. Smith approaches the question of US-EU security cooperation from a different angle 
than Howorth by tackling the question of why there is so much variation in US-EU security 
cooperation despite the fact that both partners face and recognize common threats posed by 
multiple crises such as the Euro crisis, terrorism and refugee and humanitarian crises. M.E. Smith 
finds that much of the variation we observe in transatlantic relations comes from the EU itself, as 
the EU’s growing experience in international security affairs in response to crises and challenges 
affects the EU’s thinking of its own international role. Although both the US and the EU are still 
committed to a strong partnership through NATO, the EU is increasingly learning to forge its own 
path in international security affairs instead of simply following the US’ lead, hence suggesting a 
weakened transatlantic relationship characterized by a stronger and more autonomous EU foreign 
and security policy. In particular, the EU seems to have a different view on what constitutes 
appropriate foreign policy behaviour than the US, it has a wider set of policy tools, and its conflict 
intervention and involvement is often viewed as more acceptable by other states than those 
conducted by the US or NATO.  Together with the EU’s own ambitions and confidence in the 
foreign and security domain, as well as its increasing ability to back up its foreign policy aims with 
action, he concludes that it is increasingly likely that the EU will play a greater role in international 
political and security affairs in the coming years.  In turn, this means that EU-US relations may be 
headed for more transatlantic conflict if the EU decides to further develop its own strategic 
autonomy, and if the two continue to disagree about the role of multilateral security cooperation 
as an alternative to unilateral policies often favored by the US.  
Two areas where the EU indeed is developing a stronger and more independent role vis a 
vis the US are in relation to rising powers China and Russia. Does military intervention define the 
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scope of emerging superpower status? Or put another way, is conventional military capacity the 
minimum criteria for the EU to be said to emerge as a stronger and more autonomous voice in US-
EU relations? For Marianne Riddervold and Guri Rosén, the answer is no, and this is in part 
owing to the ability of the EU to sometimes recast problems the US interprets as solvable solely 
with the hammer of military intervention as problems of trade or diplomacy.  Riddervold and 
Rosén conceptualize the rising powers of China and Russia as taking crisis proportions as the US 
and EU are forced to adapt to a multipolar world where previously the US was the unquestioned 
single global hegemon. In addressing the question of how the rising powers have impacted EU 
integration and US-EU relations, the authors find that EU-US relations have not been characterized 
by balancing in the neo-realist sense. Rather than the EU playing the expected junior partner role 
in tandem with the US as senior partner,they find evidence of the EU forging its own path in 
service of its ambition to be considered a global player in its own right, in line with Howorth and 
M.E. Smith’s argument. The EU has not simply followed the US’ lead or demands. Nor is there 
evidence of coordination between the EU and the US on the South China Sea. Riddervold and 
Rosén’s main finding regarding the impact of the Ukraine crisis and the South China Sea dispute 
on transatlantic relations is that although the US and the EU cooperate broadly in security 
questions, the EU also shows clear signs of independence in approaching security concerns rather 
than following the US lead. To the extent that the EU continues to pursue its own path, US-EU 
relations can thus be said to be weakening as the EU purses an emerging superpower status.  
Multilateral Governance  
A second key pillar of the transatlantic relationship is the multilateral, international institutional 
and normative order, established after the Second World War by the US and evident in particular 
within the UN framework. Three of our articles discuss EU-US relations and issues of multilateral 
governance. The three papers share the conclusion that EU-US relations are weakening, but for 
different reasons, and with the level of EU coherence varying widely across the cases. While Mai’a 
Cross (2018) argues that the EU is emerging as a superpower in a weakening EU-US relationship 
in the international climate regime, Akasemi Newsome (2018) and Michael Smith (2018) find 
evidence not only of a weakening relationship between the EU and the US regarding their 
attachment to multilateralism and human rights, but also of a more fragmented EU.  
Cross’ article explores EU unity and EU-US relations in light of the climate crisis by addressing 
the question of how the US could take credit for the Paris Climate Accords in light of the extensive 
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US record of opposition to prior climate change negotiations. Cross answers this by considering 
the underexplored role of the EU in the success of Paris.  She argues that not only has the EU been 
unrecognized for the strong negotiating position it developed to deliver the Paris Accords, but also 
that the EU arrived at its position of leverage in competition with the US to be the leading global 
actor in this specific area.  Cross’ paper thus provides evidence for a unified emerging EU 
superpower and increasingly weakened transatlantic relations within multilateral climate 
negotiations. In this view of the EU as an emerging superpower, able to extract and export its 
policy preferences in response to the climate crisis, Cross underscores the importance of the EU’s 
Green Diplomacy Network as an epistemic community. EU diplomats took advantage of the time 
between accords, particularly in the years before Paris, to proactively approach and cooperate with 
developing countries to help them meet the targets to be set by the Paris Accords. Cross also notes 
that the narrative and discourse around climate action changed as a result of the EU’s diplomatic 
labor, hence identifying the mechanisms behind the EU’s success in establishing agreement. In 
dialogue with social constructivist work such as Cornish and Edwards 2001; Cross 2016; Elgström 
and Leonard 2006, Cross’ argument for the EU as an emerging superpower in this domain 
highlights the features of the unique issue of climate change and specific possibilities for the EU 
to assert itself in a dominant way. Over several years, member states have readily pooled resources 
and expertise, supported legislation and set targets in response to the climate crisis via European 
institutions. Not only has climate policy been an area of deeper integration within the EU, the EU 
has been able to export a relatively unified vision of climate policy abroad. This is owing in no 
small part to the fact that the means of exporting the EU’s preferences in climate policy play to its 
‘soft power’ strengths in diplomacy and trade. When considering transatlantic relations in response 
to the climate crisis, the main role of the US has been as an opponent of joint, binding multilateral 
action. The climate change crisis is therefore clear in its impact on weakening transatlantic 
relations for the consistent way the US and the EU have staked opposite positions on the need for 
aggressive policy action as the necessary response to this crisis.  
Also Akasemi Newsome (2018) finds that transatlantic relations are weakening. Since the 
Second World War and the establishment of the UN and the international human rights 
conventions, the joint commitment to human rights has been one of the shared normative 
underpinnings of the transatlantic relationship.  On a declaratory level, we also find this 
commitment demonstrated in founding EU and US documents such as the U.S. Constitution and 
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Declaration of Independence, the Treaty of European Union and the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Interested in the extent to which the EU and the US actually live up to these 
ideals in practice and what this tells us about developments in transatlantic relations, Newsome 
examines the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on transatlantic support for human rights and 
hence US-EU relations. To do this, Newsome explores the EU and the US’ willingness and ability 
to live up to their human rights obligations vis a vis refugees in a comparison of the Kosovo and 
Syria crises. Newsome finds that EU-US cooperation is weakening in relation to human rights, 
and that the EU is struggling to come to a common position, hence risking fragmentation of the 
EU over a topic that has often been regarded even as part of the EU’s external identity. In contrast 
to for example Smith, M.E. Smith, Cross and Riddervold and Rosén ’s papers who argue that 
development within the EU also contribute to a weakening of the relationship, her main finding is 
that the most important determinant of the strength of transatlantic relations lies with the US’ role 
as a leader. By comparing the two crisis, Newsome finds that transatlantic cooperation area has 
weakened owing to the withdrawal of US leadership. While the Kosovo refugee crisis led to 
increased transatlantic cooperation as the EU was pushed into greater cooperation under US 
leadership, in the Syrian refugee crisis, both the EU member states and the US have acted 
unilaterally and have not lived up to their human rights obligations. A big difference between the 
Kosovo conflict and the Syrian conflict has been that the US has been unwilling to provide 
leadership, both militarily and diplomatically. Absent US leadership, Newsome argues, the 
European countries have moreover remained divided both over how to deal with the crisis and 
over how to engage the US and contribute to resolving the Syrian refugee crisis. Thus, she 
concludes, vis-a-vis the refugee crisis we see a fragmented EU in a weakening relationship, 
suggesting an unravelling of EU-US relations in this domain.  
Finally, Michael Smith’s article discusses the interconnectedness between changing 
transatlantic relations on the one hand and what he refers to as the contemporary crisis in 
multilateralism on the other.  To explore the roles played by EU-US relations in the crisis of  
multilateralism, Smith addresses three questions: What the crisis of contemporary multilateralism 
implies; what roles the EU and the US have played in this crisis, and lastly, what current and future 
position the EU and the US, and hence the transatlantic relationship, have in the multilateral 
system. Substantiating the argument that there indeed is a crisis in contemporary multilateralism, 
Smith shows how transatlantic relations are both a reflection of this crisis as well as contributor to 
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it. Exploring the EU-US relationship along the three key organizing principles in the multilateral, 
global system – norms, institutions and negotiation – he makes the argument that there are 
significant disintegrating and fragmenting forces at play in US-EU relations, as an ongoing crisis 
in multilateralism fuels further crises in multilateral cooperation. According to Smith, this crisis in 
multilateralism stems largely from an increasing ambiguity about what the EU and US roles and 
positions on multilateralism amount to now that they both face internal and external challenges on 
a variety of fronts. In the EU, the rise of populism, Brexit, and a common impetus among member 
states to seek special relationships with the US in a more uncertain environment undermine the 
EU’s ability to speak with one voice and continue its deeper integration project. Contrary to Cross, 
Howorth, M.E. Smith and Riddervold and Rosen, but similar to Newsome’s findings, Smith’s 
findings indicate that the EU is becoming more fragmented in its internal dealings with multiple 
internal and external crises and challenges. For the US, it is the prospect of rising powers and 
multi-polarity that brings the biggest element of uncertainty to US decision-making. The US faces 
internal challenges as well, owing to tensions between nationalist and somewhat more 
cosmopolitan orientations among political elites, high-lighted not least by the populist Trump 
movement (Also Peterson 2018, this issue). Illustrating his argument, TTIP failed because the 
crisis of multilateralism renders it unclear which EU will show up in transatlantic and other 
multilateral forums, and because member states sought special deals in parallel to a common EU 
position. Similar ambiguities are evident in the Iran nuclear deal. Thus, although the EU and the 
US are enmeshed in a veritable “forest of institutions dedicated to managing transactions and the 
inevitable disputes between the EU and the US” that forms a regime of “transatlantic governance” 
(Smith 2018; X), Smith argues that this has not been enough to keep transatlantic multilateralism 
going. Instead, the transatlantic relationship is ‘uncertain, fluid and thus by implication unstable’ 
(Smith 2018; X) and hence likely to continue to weaken, resulting in something in between the 
differentiating and unravelling transatlantic relations.  
 
Structure and agency: US leadership and the transatlantic partnership 
Our two final articles, by Jeffrey Anderson and John Peterson, address the potential impact of 
structural and agency-related factors on the transatlantic relationship, by empirically discussing 
the importance of who occupies the White House. While one article primarily confronts the Trump 
phenomenon, the other focuses mainly on the Obama presidency, comparing this to that of Trump.  
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In his paper, Jeffrey Anderson takes stock of the transatlantic relationship one decade after 
Anderson, Ikenberry and Risse in ‘The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order’ 
(2008) explored whether or not this relationship was in crisis owing to the Bush administration’s 
policies and the Iraq war in particular. Arguing that the number of crises facing the EU and indeed 
the transatlantic relationship as such exceed anything we have seen since the second world war, 
Anderson applies Ikenberry’s framework of what constitutes a crisis in the Atlantic Political Order 
to explore transatlantic relations under the Obama administration before turning to changes 
following the election of Donald Trump. Comparing the Obama years with Trump’s recent actions, 
Anderson argues that although it is too early to draw long term conclusions, empirics suggest that 
the transatlantic relationship is weakening.  Indeed, the transatlantic relationship also had to deal 
with crises and challenges in the Obama years such as the Snowden affair, as well as those under 
George W. Bush. However, the transatlantic relationship overcame these pressures. Under Obama, 
this was to a large degree owing to the reemergence of a common perceived threat from Russia 
following its annexation of Crimea. More importantly, however, Anderson argues, the relationship 
regained a stable footing because the main norms, institutions and sense of community underlying 
the Atlantic Political Order remained intact. Although the Americans and the Europeans disagreed 
over interests such as how to deal with terrorism, the US never questioned the importance of the 
relationship as such or the importance of common institutions and regimes such as NATO or EU-
US relations. This is where the current situation differs from previous crises, as Trump questions 
the very commitment to and normative underpinning of this relationship. This is also why 
Anderson predicts that the transatlantic relationship itself might be in crisis this time and that it 
might take more to regain confidence than ever before. After all, even if much of Trump’s actions 
remain rhetorical, if trust in the US’ commitment to common institutions and the very transatlantic 
relationship withers, a transatlantic partnership gets all the more difficult to uphold over time.  
Finally, John Peterson’s article considers the implications of the crises context and in particular 
the actions of Donald Trump on US-EU relations by contextualizing this question in terms of the 
agency of political actors and the structure of the international system. Peterson links the survival 
of the liberal international, institutional order, of which he views the transatlantic alliance as a core 
component, as especially significant for the future viability of US-EU relations. In particular, he 
is interested in whether or not the Trump administration’s agency will lead to changes that threaten 
the transatlantic alliance and indeed the liberal international order, or if there is evidence to suggest 
 17 
that the structure of the international system and the transatlantic relationship is strong enough to 
constrain the impact of Trump as a change agent. Adding to this, Peterson also explores the impact 
of domestic politics on the transatlantic relationship.  Peterson considers the empirical cases of 
crisis such as the rise of Trump and Brexit in order to argue that because liberal internationalism 
no longer has domestic political support, the liberal order, US-EU relations and democratic 
stability in the US and EU are bound together and potentially endangered. In Peterson’s discussion 
of Donald Trump’s presidency as a crisis for US-EU relations, he portrays a US administration 
taking the lead in shredding transatlantic relations by casting doubt on the validity of Article 5 of 
NATO, demanding billions from European allies for security guarantees, attacking free trade and 
expressing affinity with authoritarian leaders. Thus, echoing other conclusions in this issue, US 
(dis)engagement is playing an important role in the weakening of transatlantic relations. Peterson 
then turns to the question of whether Europe can rise to fill the power vacuum. While he is reluctant 
to label the EU an emerging superpower, Peterson does show evidence that the EU has taken 
important steps to integrate further in foreign and security policy, in line with Howorth, M.E. Smith 
and Riddervold and Rosén’s findings discussed above. The increased cooperation he observed in 
NATO and under Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) where 25 of 27 member states have 
committed to increased military partnerships was fueled in large part by Brexit, not only the change 
in the US presidency. In the conclusion, Peterson returns to the link he has made between internal 
democratic politics in both the US and the EU on the one hand, and the future of the liberal order 
and the transatlantic alliance on the other hand. In his view, what prevents the EU from attaining 
superpower status as well as a strengthened transatlantic alliance is that citizens in the North 
Atlantic share a rising disillusionment with the traditional political classes and outcomes in western 
democracies as well as globalization more generally. In the end, in Peterson’s view, this domestic 
factor is what in the long term will pose the most severe challenge to the transatlantic relationship 
and the liberal order more broadly.  
A transatlantic relationship in crisis? 
This special issue set out to explore if and how EU-US relations have been impacted by the context 
of multiple crises and the parallel change in US policies under the Trump administration. To do 
this, the eight articles in this collection address two questions: 1) Is the EU unified vis-a-vis the 
US in its dealing with crises, or are the EU member states becoming more fragmented in their 
response? 2) To what extent are US and EU relations strengthening or weakening in different 
 18 
fields? Our findings are clear: All the articles find evidence to suggest that EU-US relations 
are weakening in the context of contemporary crises and a changing US administration. This 
weakening of EU-US relations is partly a consequence of the EU’s own, internal policies. 
Although stopping short of designating the EU as an emerging superpower, four articles suggest 
that the EU has become a significantly more autonomous actor in relation to the US, particularly 
in the area of foreign and security policy, as the EU member states stand together in the face of 
crises and changing US policies (Cross, Howorth, M.E. Smith and Riddervold and Rosén).  On the 
other hand, two articles instead argue that the EU member states are fragmented in their relations 
with the US, instead suggesting a fragmentation or differentiation of EU-US relations (Newsome 
and Smith). Most importantly, however, the observed weakening of EU-US relations is a 
consequence of the two actors’ increasingly diverging perspectives, policies and positions on 
international issues, institutions, norms and indeed the value of the transatlantic relationship as 
such. As summed up in Michael Smith’s article (Smith 2018: X), we observe a ‘decline both in 
the salience and in the solidarity of the broader transatlantic relationship, which has historically 
been based on commitments to shared values and institutional affiliations both within and outside 
the transatlantic arena.’   
So what are the broader implications of these findings? What can we expect of the future EU-US 
relationship – is the transatlantic relationship as such in crisis? As Peterson (2018, this Issue) 
argues, the answer to this question largely depends on our assumptions about the relative 
importance of structure and agency in understanding international relations. While an actor-
focused approach puts emphasis on more immediate factors such as the impact of Trump as a 
potential ‘change agent’ (Peterson 2018, this Issue), more structurally oriented perspectives would 
predict that the very existence of established institutions and norms will have a long-term 
stabilizing effect on the transatlantic relationship, allowing it to survive various crises and a 
changing US leadership. After all, as Anderson discusses in his article, this is not the first time the 
EU-US relationship is in crisis. Nor is this the first time the EU is facing severe crisis. What the 
findings across the articles in this special issue suggest, however, is that contrary to previous 
periods, today, also the institutional and normative structure of the transatlantic relationship as 
such is being challenged. Individual actions, a multitude of crises combined with increasingly 
diverging perspectives on the value and importance of multilateral cooperation and norms, less 
public support, and a decrease in trust between the two allies together serve to weaken the 
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transatlantic relationship. Although one should be careful not to predict the future, the combination 
of all of these factors suggest that the transatlantic relationship is under more pressure today than 
in any other period since its establishment after the Second World War, putting the strength of the 
transatlantic, institutional structure to a particularly hard test. To return to Ikenberry’s definition 
of crisis, this indeed seems to be ‘an extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of 
the’ transatlantic relationship ‘are called into question.’ Although the long-term effects remain to 
be seen, it is likely that the cracks in the foundation of transatlantic relations will continue into the 
present and foreseeable future. 
 
References 
Alcaro, R. Greco, E. and Peterson, J. (eds) (2016) The West and the Global Power 
Shift:  Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Anderson, J. G. Ikenberry, J. and Risse, T. (eds.) (2008) The End of the West? Crisis and Change 
in the Atlantic Order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Binnendijk, H. (ed.) (2014) A Transatlantic Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnerships 
Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations. 
 
Bremmer, I. (2016) ‘The Hollow Alliance,’ Time June 16. 
 
Bulmer, S. and Quaglia, L. (Forthcoming 2018) Special issue on ‘The Politics and Economics of 
Brexit,’Journal of European Public Policy 
 
Caporaso, J. and Rhodes, M. (2016) The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone 
Crisis, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Cooper, R. (2003) The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century, 
London: Atlantic Books. 
 
Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter (eds) (2016) Special issue on ‘The Political Economy of the 
Euro Crisis,’ Comparative Political Science, volume 49, 2016.  
 
Cross, M. and Ma, X. (2015) ‘EU Crises & Integrational Panic: The Role of the Media,’ Journal 
of European Public Policy 22(8): 1053-1070. 
 
Cross M. K., and Karolewski I.P.  (2017) ‘What type of power has the EU exercised in the 
Ukraine-Russia crisis? A framework of analysis,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 55 (1):3-
19. 
 
 20 
Economist (2016) ‘A shock for NATO Defend me maybe. Donald Trump casually undermines 
the world’s most important alliance’, the Economist, July 30th 2016 online at: 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21702771-donald-trump-casually-undermines-worlds-
most-important-alliance-defend-me-maybe 
 
Elgstöm, O. and Smith, M. (2006) 'Introduction', in O. Elgstöm and M. Smith (eds), The 
European Union's Roles in International Politics, London and New York: Routledge: 1-10. 
 
Eriksen, E.O and Fossum. J.E. (eds) (2000) Democracy in the European Union - Integration 
through Deliberation, London: Routledge. 
 
EUROSTAT (2018) “Asylum Statistics” Accessed March 26, 2018  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 
 
Falkner. G. (ed.) (2016) Special issue on ‘EU Policies in Times of Crisis’ in European 
Integration volume 38, 2016.  
 
Freyburg, T. and Richter, S. (2015) ‘Local actors in the driver’s seat: Transatlantic democracy 
promotion under regime competition in the Arab World,’ Democratization 22(3); 496-518 
 
Frölich, S. (2012) The new Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations. Coordinated Responses to 
common dangers, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
 
Genschel, P. and Jachtenfuchs, M. (2013) Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European 
Integration of Core State Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Graziano, P. and Halpern, C. (eds) (2016) Special issue on ‘EU governance in times of crisis: 
Inclusiveness and effectiveness beyond the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law divide,’ Comparative European 
Politics, volume 14 (1) 2016. 
 
Hamilton, D. S. (2014) ‘Transatlantic Challenges: Ukraine, TTIP and the Struggle to be 
Strategic,’ Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 52; 25-39. 
 
Hill, C. Smith, M. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2017) ‘International Relations and the European 
Union’ (third edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Howorth, J. (2007). Security and defence policy in the European Union, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Howorth, J. & Menon, A., (2009) ‘Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not 
Balancing the United States,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53: 727-744. 
 
Hume, T. And Pawle, L. (2015) ‘Number of migrants reaching Europe this year passes 1 
million,’ CNN 22 December. 
 
Hyde-Price, A. (2006) 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', Journal of European Public 
Policy, 13(2): 217-234. 
 21 
 
Ikenberry, G. J. (2018): ‘The End of Liberal International Order?’, International Affairs, 94 (1): 
7-23. 
 
Ilgen, T. L. (Ed.). (2016). Hard power, soft power and the future of transatlantic relations. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Laffan, B. (ed.) (2016) Special issue on ‘Europe's Union in Crisis: Tested and Contested’ West 
European Politics, volume 39 (5)  
 
Leuffen, D. Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2012) Differentiated Integration. Explaining 
Variance in the European Unio, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
MacFarlane, N. and Menon, A. (2014) ‘The EU & Ukraine’, Survival, 56(3). 
 
Majone, G. (2005) Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of 
Integration by Stealth, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
 
Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40(2): 235-258. 
 
Mény, Y. (2014) ‘Managing the EU Crises: Another Way of Integration by Stealth,’ West 
European Politics 37(6), 1336-1353. 
 
Moravcsik, A and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) ‘Neoliberal intergovernmentalism’, Wiener, A and 
Diez, T (ed) European integration theory (2nd edition), (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 
67-87. 
 
Niemann, A. and Zaun, N. (2018) “EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: 
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives,” Journal of Common Market Studies 56(1): 3-22 
 
Nye, J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs 
Press. 
 
Oliver, T. (2016) ‘New Challenges, New Voices: Next Generation Viewpoints on Transatlantic 
Relations’. LSE Ideas – Dahrendorf Forum Special Report, May 2016.  
 
Peterson, J. (2018): Europe and America: Partners and Rivals in International Relations, 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Peterson, J. and Pollack, M.A. (eds.) (2003) Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in 
the Twenty-First Century, USA and Canada: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Pop, V. (2015) ‘Europe’s Migrant Crisis Puts Open Borders at Risk,’ Wall Street Journal, 29 
October. 
 
Posen, B.R. (2006) 'European Union security and defence policy: Response to Unipolarity?', 
Security Studies 15(2): 149-186. 
 22 
Riddervold, M. (2011) ‘Finally flexing its muscles? Atalanta - the EU’s naval military operation 
against piracy,’ European Security 20(3): 385-404. 
 
Riddervold, M. (2018) The Maritime Turn In EU Foreign and Security Policies, Palgrave 
MacMillan 
 
Risse, T. and Kleine, M. (2010) ‘Deliberation in negotiations’ Journal of European Public 
Policy, 17 (5): 708-726. 
 
Rose, G. (2018) ‘Letting Go. Trump, America, and the World’, Foreign Affairs, 97 (2): 1-192 
 
Schimmelfenng, F. (Forthcoming 2018) “Brexit: differentiated disintegration in the European 
Union,” Journal of European Public Policy 
 
Schmitter, P. (1970) ‘A Revised Theory of Regional Integration,’ International Organizations 
24(4): 836-68. 
 
Sjursen, H. (2006) 'The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?', Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13(2): 235-251. 
 
Smith, S. and Gebhard, C. (2017) “EU-NATO Relations: Running on the Fumes of Informed 
Deconfliction” European Security 26(3): 303-314. 
 
Sola, N. F., & Smith, M. (2009). Perceptions and Policy in Transatlantic Relations: Prospective 
visions from the US and Europe. New York and London: Routledge. 
 
Walt, S. M., (1998) ‘The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart’. The 
National Interest 54, 3-11. 
 
Walt, S. M (2017) In Praise of a Transatlantic Divorce, Foreign Policy, 30/5-2017. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/30/in-praise-of-a-transatlantic-divorce-trump-merkel-europe-
nato/ 
 
Waltz, K. (2000) ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’. International Security, 25, 5-41. 
 
Zakaria, F. (2017) ‘FDR started the Long Peace. Under Trump, it may be coming to an end’ 
Opinion in The Washington Post, 26/1-2018, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/fdr-started-the-long-peace-under-
trump-it-may-be-coming-to-an-end/2017/01/26/2f0835e2-e402-11e6-ba11-
63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?utm_term=.6c3a972974cd 
 
Zielonka, J. (2013) ‘Europe’s new civilising missions: the EU’s normative power discourse,’ 
Journal of Political Ideologies 18(1); 35-55. 
  
 23 
 
